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Abstract
This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium
payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends
to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994),
Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille (2011) obtain.
As a second corollary, in the context of repeated games, it follows that this limit set of
payoffs is a polytope (a bounded polyhedron) when attention is restricted to equilibria in
pure strategies. We provide a two-player game in which this limit set is not a polytope when
mixed strategies are considered.
Keywords: stochastic games, repeated games, folk theorem.
JEL codes: C72, C73
1 Introduction
Given how much the literature on repeated and stochastic games has focused on the case
in which discounting vanishes, it might be surprising how little is known about the limiting
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equilibrium payoff set when sufficient conditions for a folk theorem are not met. In the case of
games with imperfect public monitoring, our knowledge about the limiting set of perfect public
equilibrium payoffs derives from the characterizations of Fudenberg and Levine (1994), and its
generalizations by Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi (2007), and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi
and Vieille (2011) in terms of a parameterized family of nonlinear programs: whenever the
characterization applies, (i) the limit of the equilibrium payoff set is well-defined, and (ii) it is
compact, convex and semialgebraic.1
This paper provides a characterization of this limit set that gives additional insights and
results. We study the dual of the program considered in Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille
(2011). We show that this dual program offers several advantages over the primal: (i) it admits
a straightforward interpretation; (ii) because the constraint set depends on the parameters of
the program through the parameters’ signs only, it is easy to solve especially for repeated games;
(iii) the various sufficient conditions for a folk theorem for repeated and stochastic games with
public monitoring that are found in the literature obtain effortlessly.
To demonstrate the tractability of the dual program, we exploit it to establish that the
limit set of pure-strategy (perfect public) equilibrium payoffs in repeated games is a polytope
(whenever the characterization applies). We provide an example of a two-player game with two
signals for which the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs is not a polytope when mixed
strategy equilibria are considered.
While our analysis focuses on the limit case in which the discount factor tends to one, du-
ality has already been applied to the case of repeated games by Cheng (2004), who obtains a
characterization for a fixed discount factor that is the counterpart of ours. To our knowledge,
Cheng is the first author to use duality to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated
games. A related application of duality to incentive problems in a static context can be found
in Obara and Rahman (2010). On the other hand, duality is a standard tool in Markov decision
processes, the “one-player” version of a stochastic game.
2 The Dual Program
In this section, we provide a characterization of the limit payoff set in stochastic games
with public signals, or more precisely, another characterization of the nonlinear programs whose
1Even less is known for Nash equilibria. For instance, convergence of the equilibrium payoff set is an open
problem.
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solution is key to the description of this payoff set. We follow Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and
Vieille (2011, hereafter HSTV) for notation and assumptions. At each stage, the game is in
one state, and players simultaneously choose actions. Nature then determines both the current
payoff, the next state and a public signal, as a function of the current state and the action profile.
The sets S of possible states, I of players, Ai of actions available to player i, and Y of public
signals are assumed finite. Given an action profile a ∈ A := ×iAi, and a state s ∈ S, we denote
by r(s, a) ∈ RI the payoff (or reward) profile when in state s given a, and by p(t, y|s, a) the joint
probability of moving to state t ∈ S and of getting the public signal y ∈ Y . A repeated game is
the special case in which there is a singleton state.
At the end of each period, the only information publicly available to all players consists of
nature’s choices: the next state together with the public signal. When properly interpreting Y ,
this includes the case of perfect monitoring and the case of publicly observed payoffs.
In each period n = 1, 2, . . ., the state sn is observed, the stage game is played, the action
profile an is realized, and the public signal yn is then revealed. The stochastic game is pa-
rameterized by the initial state s1. The public history at the beginning of period n is then
hn = (s1, y1, . . . , sn−1, yn−1, sn). We set H1 := S, the set of initial states. The set of public his-
tories at the beginning of period n is therefore Hn := (S × Y )n−1 × S, and we let H :=
⋃
n≥1Hn
denote the set of all public histories. The private history for player i at the beginning of pe-
riod n is a sequence hin = (s1, a1, y1, . . . , sn−1, an−1, yn−1, sn), and we similarly define H
i
1 := S,





A (behavior) strategy for player i ∈ I is a map σi : H i → ∆(Ai). Every pair of initial state
s1 and strategy profile σ generates a probability distribution over histories in the obvious way
and thus also generates a distribution over sequences of the players’ rewards. Players seek to
maximize their payoff, that is, the average discounted sum of their rewards, using a common
discount factor δ < 1. Thus, the payoff of player i ∈ I if the initial state is s1 and the players





A strategy σi is public if it depends on the public history only, and not on player i’s private
information. That is, a public strategy is a map σi : H → ∆(Ai). A perfect public equilibrium
(hereafter, PPE, or simply equilibrium) is a profile of public strategies such that, given any
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period n and public history hn, the strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium from that period on.
We denote by E(s, δ) ⊂ RI the (compact) set of PPE payoffs of the game with initial state s ∈ S
and discount factor δ < 1. All statements about convergence of, or equality between sets are
understood in the sense of the Hausdorff distance d(A,B) between sets A, B.
The main element of the characterization of HSTV is the solution to the following nonlinear
program, where λ ∈ RI is fixed. Given a state s ∈ S and a map x : S × Y → RS×I , we denote






p(t, y|s, as)xt(s, y),
where xt(s, y) ∈ RI is the t-th component of x(s, y).




where the supremum is taken over all v ∈ RI , x : S×Y → RS×I , and α = (αs)s ∈ (×i∈I∆(Ai))S
such that
(i) For each s, αs is a Nash equilibrium with payoff v of the game Γ(s, x);
(ii) For each T ⊆ S, for each permutation ϕ : T → T and each map ψ : T → Y , one has
λ ·
∑
s∈T xϕ(s)(s, ψ(s)) ≤ 0.
The program P(λ) is a generalization to stochastic games of the program introduced by Fuden-
berg and Levine (1994) for repeated games, based in turn on the recursive representation of the
payoff set given by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990).
Denote by k(λ) ∈ [−∞,+∞] the value of P(λ). HSTV prove that the feasible set of P(λ) is
non-empty, so that k(λ) > −∞, and that the value of P(λ) is finite, so that k(λ) < +∞.
HSTV assume that the limit set of PPE payoffs is independent of the initial state: for all
s, t ∈ S, limδ→1 d(E(s, δ), E(t, δ)) = 0 (Assumption A). HSTV prove that, under Assumption
A and a full-dimensionality condition, the family of programs (indexed by λ) characterizes the






{v ∈ RI | λ · v ≤ k(λ)} ∀s ∈ S.
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As our focus is the program itself, we shall not need Assumption A for what follows.
For a fixed Markov strategy (αs)s, the feasible set is non-empty if and only if for all s, αs is









i)ri(s, ai, α−is ) ≤ ri(s, αs).
Indeed, it follows from Fan (1956) that there exists x : S × Y → RS×I such that for each s, αs
is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(s, x) if and only if for each s, αs is admissible. Adding a
constant to each xt(s, y) that is independent of (t, y), we may assume that the equilibrium payoff
vs is independent of s. Finally, considering any i for which λ
i 6= 0, we may add (or subtract if
λi < 0) a constant to xit(s, y), independent of s, t, y, so that the constraint (ii) is satisfied.














where the minimum is over (α̂is)s,i for all i for which λ









i) ≤ 0 if λi > 0 and αis(ai) = 0, α̂is(ai) ≥ 0 if λi < 0 and αis(ai) = 0, and
p̂ (t, y|s) := p
(
t, y|s, α̂is, α−is
)
≥ 0,
as well as over βs ≥ 0,
∑
s βs = 1 such that (βs)s is an invariant distribution of p̂ (t× Y |s). (If
there are multiple invariant distributions, use the one that minimizes the objective function.)
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 1 For all λ ∈ RI, the programs P(λ) and P̃(λ) yield the same value.
The constraints appearing in P̃(λ) have a natural interpretation: each player can only de-
viate to a strategy (α̂is)s that leads to a distribution over signals and states—via the invariant
distribution—that is the same for all players’ deviations. That is, it is as if adversarial players
were choosing the deviation strategies (α̂is)s,i in a coordinated manner, subject to the constraint
5
that they cannot be told apart, whether through the public signals or through the state tran-
sitions, and the objective is to minimize the λ-weighted average payoff given those deviations.
(Notice, however, that “deviations” are defined in an unusual way so that α̂is(a
i) may take negative
values.)
One of the advantages of this dual characterization is that the weight vector λ no longer
appears in the constraints, or rather, it only appears via the signs of these weights. This makes
the program especially tractable for repeated games: for each admissible strategy profile α and
each “orthant” in which λ might lie, we are left with a linear program with variables α̂ = (α̂i)i,
where λ appears only in the objective. Hence, for each α and each orthant, there are only finitely
many candidates of α̂ to consider. This does not only make the analysis tractable, but it also
yields some qualitative results. See Section 4.
Cheng (2004)’s Theorem 5 corresponds to P̃(λ) with |S| = 1, where (βs)s collapses to the
point mass.
From the dual program P̃(λ), and given the characterization of the equilibrium payoff sets
from Fudenberg and Levine for the case of repeated games, the existing folk theorems follow
immediately. This is obvious for the sufficient conditions given by Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
(1994). As for those of Kandori and Matsushima (1998), note that their conditions can be
stated in terms of convex cones.2 Adapting slightly their notation, let Qi(a) := {p(·|a−i, ãi)|ãi ∈
Ai \{ai}} be the set of distributions over signals as player i’s action varies over all his actions but
ai. Let C i(a) denote the convex cone with vertex 0 spanned by Qi(a)−p(·|a). Assumption A2 of
Kandori and Matsushima requires C i(a) ∩ −Cj(a) = {0} and that 0 is not a non-trivial conical
combination of Qi(a)−p(·|a), whereas Assumption A3 requires C i(a)∩Cj(a) = {0} for all i 6= j
and a ∈ Ex(A) (the set of action profiles achieving some extreme point of the feasible payoff set).
Note now that the restriction on α̂, when α = a is pure, is that p(·|α̂i, a−i) − p(·|a) ∈ −C i(a)
whenever λi > 0, and p(·|α̂i, a−i) − p(·|a) ∈ C i(a) whenever λi < 0. Assumptions A2 and A3
then imply that α̂i = ai for non-coordinate directions λ.3
Similarly, HSTV’s folk theorem for stochastic games follows immediately under their as-
sumptions F1 and F2. Our results are also reminiscent of the link between the average cost
optimality equation and linear programming formulations in Markov decision processes (see
Hernández-Lerma and Lasserre, 1999, Ch. 12), and consistent with the results of Hoffman and
2Note that the working paper of Kandori and Matsushima (1998) gives weaker conditions than the published
one, which can be seen to also follow immediately from P̃(λ).
3For coordinate directions, admissibility suffices (cf. Kandori and Matsushima’s Assumption A1).
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Karp (1966).4
As a final remark, one can characterize the limit set of pure-strategy PPE payoffs by modifying
the primal P(λ) so that the supremum is taken over pure strategies α ∈ AS. The corresponding
dual P̃(λ) is given by taking the supremum over all admissible pure strategies.
3 Proof of Theorem 1





over x and v such that, for all s, i,
∑
t,y
p (t, y|s, αs) xit (s, y)− vi = −ri (s, αs) ,






t, y|s, ai, α−is
)
− p (t, y|s, αs)
]









xϕ(s) (s, ψ (s)) ≤ 0.
This is a linear program for (x, v). The first set of constraint ensures that αs yields the same
payoff v in all states, the second that playing αs is a Nash equilibrium, and the third is the
same constraint as (ii). Because we assumed that αs is admissible for all s, the feasible set is
non-empty, and because the value of this program is bounded above by k(λ), it is finite. We
4We may think of a Markov decision process (MDP) with irreducible transitions as a stochastic game with a
single player and no signal. In this case, take a pure optimal Markov strategy a∗ = (a∗s)s in the MDP without
discounting. The only deviations (α̂s)s that satisfy the constraints in the dual P̃(1) must improve the objective
(they must assign non-positive weights to the actions other than a∗s, and weight at least one to a
∗
s) so that,
minimizing over those deviations, it is best to set α̂s = a
∗
s for all s. It follows that (βs)s is the invariant distribution
under the optimal strategy a∗, and the value of the program is equal to the optimal expected (undiscounted)
average payoff of the MDP. One can solve the other dual P̃(−1) similarly.
7
















i) ≥ 0, ηTϕψ ≥ 0, γis ∈ R such that, for all s, t, y, i,




p (t, y|s, αs)− p
(












There is no loss in assuming λi 6= 0 for all i (we focus on the relevant subset of players otherwise).






















s = 1 for all s, i, such that,
for all s, t, y, i,




p (t, y|s, αs)− p
(












and so βis =: βs is nonnegative and independent of i. Furthermore, by adding over s, we get
that
∑
T,ϕ,ψ |T |ηTϕψ = 1. Note also that, if βs = 0 for some s, then
∑
T∋s,ϕ,ψ ηTϕψ = 0, and so,




p (t, y|s, αs)− p
(





Furthermore, because, given s and i, the variables ξis(a






i) 6= 0, or ξis(ai) = 0 for all ai. Note that, in the former case, we can define





i), and admissibility then implies that the
corresponding term in the objective function is nonnegative, and setting ξis(a
i) = 0 for all ai




for all i, ai, and the terms in the objective and the constraints that involve the state s vanish.
Therefore, we might as well assume βs > 0 for all s.































i) = 1 for all s, i, α̂is(a
i) ≤ 0 if λi > 0 and αis(ai) = 0, and
α̂is(a







with large M so that ξis(a

















i) = 1, α̂is(a
i) ≤ 0 if λi > 0 and αis(ai) = 0, and α̂is(ai) ≥ 0 if λi < 0
and αis(a
i) = 0 as well as βs ≥ 0,
∑
s βs = 1, and ηTϕψ ≥ 0, such that, for all s, t, y, i,
βsp
(






Note that if βs > 0, then it follows from (1) that p (t, y|s, α̂is, α−is ) is nonnegative and independent




s for all i without loss in the objective function. Thus
in both cases, we can assume that p̂ (t, y|s) := p (t, y|s, α̂is, α−is ) ≥ 0. Also note that (βs)s is an
invariant distribution of the transition function p̂ (t× Y |s). To see this, take the sum of (1) over
s, y, and we have
∑
s





Conversely, if (βs)s is an invariant distribution of p̂ (t× Y |s), then it follows from Lemma 1 of
HSTV that there exists ηTϕψ ≥ 0 that satisfies (1).5












over (α̂is)s,i for all i for which λ





i) = 1, α̂is(a
i) ≤ 0 if λi > 0 and αis(ai) = 0,
and α̂is(a
i) ≥ 0 if λi < 0 and αis(ai) = 0, and
p̂ (t, y|s) := p
(
t, y|s, α̂is, α−is
)
≥ 0,
as well as βs ≥ 0,
∑
s βs = 1 such that (βs)s is an invariant distribution of p̂ (t× Y |s). (If there
are multiple invariant distributions, use the one that minimizes the objective function.) Taking
the supremum over admissible (αs)s, this gives us precisely P̃(λ).
4 The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Repeated Games
This section focuses on repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Throughout, the
sets of actions and signals are finite, and attention is restricted to perfect public equilibria. For
a fixed discount factor δ < 1, E(δ) denotes the set of mixed-strategy PPE payoffs, and Ep(δ)
denotes the set of pure-strategy PPE payoffs. The limits of these equilibrium payoff sets (as
δ → 1) are denoted by E = limδ→1E(δ) and Ep = limδ→1Ep(δ), respectively. We show that (i)
Ep has either empty interior or is a polytope; (ii) the result does not extend to E, which includes
mixed-strategy equilibria.
The characterization of Fudenberg and Levine (1994) implies that these limits E and Ep are
well-defined, and that E and Ep are compact, convex and semialgebraic by the Tarski-Seidenberg
theorem. (The extension by Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi (2007) establishes that this is true
even if these limit sets have empty interior.) In addition, both E and Ep are independent of
the availability of a public randomization device. In the absence of such a device, none of these
properties (except compactness) holds for a fixed discount factor, as explained below.
Because their program is such that the vector of weights λ appears both in the constraints
5Use the indicator function of (s, t) for (xt(s)) in the notation of Lemma 1. Note that one can easily generalize
Lemma 1 to cases without irreducibility.
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and in the objective, it is difficult to obtain sharper results from the primal. In contrast, because
the constraints in the dual only involve the signs of the weights, for each admissible action profile
a ∈ A and each orthant of λ, we have finitely many linear constraints on α̂, which are independent
of λ. The result then follows since there are only finitely many candidates of α̂ that can minimize
the linear objective.
Corollary 1 Assume that Ep has non-empty interior. Then Ep is a polytope.6
Before proving this result, let us briefly mention what is known about Ep(δ) and E(δ) for fixed
δ < 1. Most of the results are for the case of perfect monitoring. For the case in which a public
randomization device is allowed, Abreu and Sannikov (2011) show that the equilibrium payoff
set Ep(δ) is a polytope, when there are only two players and monitoring is perfect. Furthermore,
they show that the set of vertices is no more than thrice the number of action profiles. It is not
known whether their results generalize to mixed strategies, more players or imperfect monitoring
(see below, however). If no public randomization device is assumed, neither E(δ) nor Ep(δ) need
be convex: non-convexity is shown by Sorin (1986), and Yamamoto (2010) provides an example
in which this is true for discount factors arbitrarily close to one. More generally, the set of
equilibrium payoffs E(δ) need not be semialgebraic. See Berg and Kitti (2010) for examples of
the fractal nature of Ep(δ), which generalizes easily to mixed strategies for low enough discount
factors.
Proof. Since Ep has non-empty interior, by Fudenberg and Levine (1994), Fudenberg, Levine




{v ∈ RI | λ · v ≤ kp(λ)},





λ · r(a, α̂),
where sgn(λ) = (sgn(λi))i, r(a, α̂) = (r
i(α̂i, a−i))i, and for each profile of signs ζ = (ζ
i)i ∈
{−1, 0, 1}I , D(a, ζ) is the set of profiles α̂ = (α̂i)i ∈ ×i∈IRAi such that for each i ∈ I with
6If Ep has empty interior, neither the primal nor the dual program applies. The primal has been generalized
by Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi (2007) to include this case, but we have not explored the dual of their
program. Clearly, with two players, the result extends to the case in which Ep has empty interior, as the set Ep
must then be either a line segment or a point.
11
ζ i 6= 0,
∑
ãi∈Ai α̂
i(ãi) = 1, α̂i(ãi) ≤ 0 if ζ i = 1 and ãi 6= ai, α̂i(ãi) ≥ 0 if ζ i = −1 and ãi 6= ai, and
p(y|α̂i, a−i) ≥ 0 is independent of i such that ζ i 6= 0. Our proof further exploits the following two
properties of the dual characterization: (1) D(a, sgn(λ)) depends on λ only through the profile
of signs of λi, and (2) D(a, sgn(λ)) is a convex polytope.
The proof will use the following standard results (see Rockafellar, 1970): (i) any polyhedron
D admits a finite subset D∗ such that any linear function on D is minimized at some point in
D∗; (ii) the convex hull of a finite union of polyhedral cones is a polyhedral cone; (iii) the polar
cone of a polyhedral cone is a polyhedral cone.7
For each ζ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}I , we define
Λ(ζ) = {λ ∈ RI | sgn(λ) = ζ}.
We also define Λ̄(ζ) as the closure of Λ(ζ)
Λ̄(ζ) = {λ ∈ RI | ∀i ∈ I, sgn(λi) ∈ {0, ζ i}}.
Taking the closure simplifies our exposition by allowing us to use standard results on polyhedra
and polyhedral cones, which are defined by weak inequalities.





λ · r(a, α̂)

















{v ∈ RI | λ · v ≤ kp(λ)}.
7To clarify our terminology, a polyhedron is the intersection of finitely many closed half-spaces, which is
generated by finitely many points and directions. A polytope is the convex hull of finitely many points, which is
equivalent to a bounded polyhedron. A cone is polyhedral if and only if it is generated by finitely many directions.
See Rockafellar (1970, Section 19 and Theorem 19.1).
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{v ∈ RI | λ · v ≤ kp(λ)}
is a polyhedron.
For each admissible a ∈ A and ζ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}I, note that D(a, ζ) is a polyhedron, and hence
finitely generated, i.e., there exist finitely many points β1, . . . , βm ∈ ×i∈IRAi and finitely many
directions βm+1, . . . , βn ∈ ×i∈IRAi such that any α̂ ∈ D(a, ζ) is represented as
α̂ = µ1β1 + · · ·+ µmβm + µm+1βm+1 + · · ·+ µnβn




λ · r(a, α̂)
has a solution in D∗(a, ζ). Note that D∗(a, ζ) is finite and depends on λ only through its sign ζ .
For each admissible a ∈ A, ζ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}I , and α̂ ∈ D∗(a, ζ), let Λ̄(a, α̂, ζ) be the set of all





λ · r(a, α̂)
is solved at (a, α̂). Let Φ(ζ) be the set of selections ϕ of D∗(·, ζ), i.e., the set of functions that
map each admissible action a′ to ϕ(a′) ∈ D∗(a′, ζ). Then we have











{λ ∈ RI | λ · (r(a, α̂)− r(a′, ϕ(a′))) ≥ 0}
)
,
hence Λ̄(a, α̂, ζ) is a finite union of polyhedral cones, and thus its convex hull is a polyhedral
cone (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 19.6).
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{v ∈ RI | λ · (v − r(a, α̂)) ≤ 0}.
Here, for each (a, α̂, ζ), since the convex hull of Λ̄(a, α̂, ζ) is a polyhedral cone, its polar cone
(with vertex r(a, α̂)),
⋂
λ∈Λ̄(a,α̂,ζ){v | λ · (v− r(a, α̂)) ≤ 0}, is also a polyhedral cone (Rockafellar,
1970, Corollary 19.2.2). Therefore, Ep(ζ) is a finite intersection of polyhedral cones, which is a
polyhedron.
This corollary raises a natural question: does the corollary extend to mixed strategies? This
is obviously the case when the assumptions for the folk theorem are satisfied—in particular, when
monitoring is perfect. We conclude this section with an example establishing that the answer is
negative, even in the case of two players. Consider the following 2× 2 game with payoffs
L R
U 5, 9 0,−3
D 8,−3 −5, 1
and two possible signals Y = {ȳ, y} with




, p(y | a) = 1− p(ȳ | a).









R), which supports payoffs (25
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Figure 1: Feasible and limit equilibrium payoff set (shaded area) in the example



































































Clearly, this set is not a polytope. See Figure 1. As E(δ) → E, this example shows that the
bound of Abreu and Sannikov (2011) on the number of extreme points of E(δ) cannot possibly
extend to mixed strategies and imperfect monitoring.
5 Concluding Comments
Theorem 1 easily extends to the case with short-run players, where the supremum in P̃ (λ)
is taken over all α such that long-run players play admissible actions and short-run players play
static best responses. Similarly, Corollary 1 holds if all (both long- and short-run) players play
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pure strategies, or if all long-run players play pure strategies and for each pure action profile
of long-run players, the induced stage game for short-run players has finitely many static Nash
equilibria.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 also extend to games with unknown payoffs or signal distributions,
where Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010) obtain a primal program à la Fudenberg and Levine
(1994) that characterizes the limit set of belief-free (or perfect type-contingently public ex-post)
equilibrium payoffs. Their sufficient conditions for a folk theorem obtain immediately. Example
1 of Hörner and Lovo (2009), with two players and two states, is an instance in which the limit
belief-free equilibrium payoff set in mixed strategies is not a polytope.
It is also straightforward to adapt Theorem 1 to the characterization of the limit payoff
set achieved by perfect communication equilibria for repeated games with imperfect private
monitoring, see Tomala (2009).
But our analysis leaves open many questions, among others:
- Is Ep a polytope even when its interior is empty (in the case in which there are more than
two players)?
- Is the limit set of pure-strategy equilibrium payoffs also a polytope in the case of finite
stochastic games? (The feasible limit payoff set is known to be a polytope.)
- Does the example showing that E need not be a polytope also establish the same result
for E(δ) (with a public randomization device) for high enough discount factors?
- What are the properties of the set of all Nash and sequential (rather than perfect public)
equilibrium payoffs and their limits (if they exist) as δ → 1?
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Appendix: Sketch of computations for the example
We use the dual program P̃(λ) to compute the maximum score k(λ) for each direction
λ = (λ1, λ2) ∈ R2. In particular, we analyze 8 cases (λ1, λ2 R 0) separately.
In the case of λ = (1, 0), we achieve k(1, 0) = 8 by enforcing α = (D,L).
In the case of λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 1, we achieve (i) k(λ1, 1) = 5λ1 + 9 by enforcing α = (U, L)
















< λ1 < 4, and (iii) k(λ1, 1) = 8λ1 − 3 by enforcing α = (D,L) if λ1 ≥ 4.
In the case of λ = (0, 1), we achieve k(0, 1) = 9 by enforcing α = (U, L).
In the case of λ1 < 0 and λ2 = 1, we achieve (i) k(λ1, 1) = 5λ1 + 9 by enforcing α = (U, L)
if −4
5
≤ λ1 < 0 or (D,R), and (ii) k(λ1, 1) = −5λ1 + 1 by enforcing α = (D,R) if λ1 < −4
5
.
In the case of λ = (−1, 0), we achieve k(−1, 0) = 0 by enforcing α = (U,R).
In the case of λ1 < 0 and λ2 = −1, the south-west border of E is driven by λ1 ≈ −7.5,
where the maximal score is achieved by enforcing either α = (U,R), which attains
k((λ1,−1), (U,R)) = −250
49
λ1 − 57, or α = (D, pL+ (1− p)R) with
p =
−50λ1
−80λ1 − 50 ,
which attains
k((λ1,−1), (D, pL+ (1− p)R)) = −250(λ
1)2 + 507λ1 + 146
−80λ1 − 50 .
By equating the two values of k((λ1,−1), α), we have































In the case of λ1 > 0 and λ2 = −1, we achieve k(λ1,−1) = 8λ1+3 by enforcing α = (D,L).
Summarizing those computations, we obtain E = {v ∈ R2 | λ · v ≤ k(λ) ∀λ ∈ R2}. In












≤ v1 ≤ 811
146
.
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